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Continental Conversations: 
Remand of Binational Panel Decisions under NAFTA Ch. 19 
 
By Chi Carmody1 
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3. Binational Panels and the Context of Compliance 
4. Binational Panels and Remand 




 Anniversaries are often occasions to look back and consider results. In law we are 
most directly concerned with results in the realm of remedies, remedies being that branch 
of the law that deals with “the means of enforcing a right or preventing or redressing a 
wrong.”2 So it is entirely appropriate that at this conference - a conference devoted to 
assessing the legal record of the North American Free Trade Agreement3 (NAFTA) on its 
tenth anniversary – we should spend at least some time thinking about NAFTA’s 
remedies and results. In short, what have they achieved? 
 This question is particularly relevant in relation to NAFTA Chapter 19, a chapter 
of the treaty entitled “Review and Dispute Settlement in Antidumping and Countervailing 
Duty Matters”, since NAFTA created a system of binational panels to review national 
anti-dumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) determinations and endowed panels 
with remedies. Among other things, NAFTA Art. 1904(8) says that “The panel may 
uphold a final determination, or remand it for action not inconsistent with the panel’s 
decision”. This provision may appear unexceptional on its own, but applied in the 
                                               
1 Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada. The writer would like to 
thank Robert Druzeta, Articling Student, Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg, Toronto, and Jim Dakin, Third Year Student at 
the University of Western Ontario Faculty of Law, for their research and other assistance with this manuscript. Any errors 
are those of the writer. 
2 See entry for “Remedy”, BLACKS’ LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed.) 1296 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 1999). 
3 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993). 
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sometimes politicized context of NAFTA it has become a focal point of adjudicative 
creativity and conflict. The principal issue is the tension between what a binational panel 
can do and what a national agency must do in response. By and large it appears that 
national agencies have complied with binational panel remand orders, but they have not 
always done so in what might be called the “full spirit” of the law and in two recent cases 
– High Fructose and Pure Magnesium - the extent of agency resistance to panel orders 
has been remarkable. The record reveals something profound about NAFTA Ch. 19, 
something which ultimately reflects upon the validity of the treaty itself. 
 Having said this I want to make clear that I am not so much concerned with the 
outcome of any single Ch. 19 case as I am with the general pattern of practice and with 
the question of what could possibly be done under binational panel review. This is 
because if we are thinking prospectively – and I take both retrospective and prospective 
thinking to be one of the principal tasks of this conference - our primary interest must be 
with remedial limits. The law of remedies is more than a collection of rules and 
principles. It is constantly shaped by the broader context.4 Consequently, a number of 
questions arise. If international oversight of national determinations is to involve more 
than deference, how far can it be taken? What sorts of boundaries must be respected? 
What others might be legitimately traversed? Binational panels under Ch. 19 have 
suggested some answers to these questions. 
 This article therefore examines the jurisprudence that has developed from 
binational panel review of national AD/CVD determinations. That is already a subset of 
Ch. 19 decisions since a number of cases have settled without reasons, and of the 
                                               
4 In domestic law it must also conform to certain fundamental arrangements that are the result of specific historic 
compromises. In relation to anti-dumping and countervailing duties it comes up against the institution of designated 
agencies whose decisions are presumed to be legitimate. 
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remainder, we are only interested in those cases where the panel has actually remanded 
with instructions. In January 2004 that amounted to about 18 cases, although several of 
these have involved two or more remands apiece.5 My immediate concern is with the 
extent and tone of adjudicative dialogue that has emerged. By “dialogue” I mean a 
concept of interpretation that has arisen as cases have made their way back and forth 
between panels and national agencies in the process of remand.6 It is a metaphor well-
known in domestic law and one increasingly encountered in international law as the 
number of international tribunals proliferates and the challenge of conflict and 
coordination among them becomes acute.7 One might be tempted to think of this dialogue 
as involving a single pronouncement – “uphold” or “remand” – but experience under Ch. 
19 reveals considerably more than a simple bipolar reaction at work. As I point out 
below, a reflexive method has arisen in which the panels and national agencies interact to 
reach a solution. The law does not dictate an answer so much as supply a process for 
getting there. 
                                               
5 NAFTA Chapter 19 cases involving remands are Synthetic Baler Twine, CDA-94-1904-02 (Final order affirming 
determination on remand July 31, 1995); Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sheet Products, CDA-94-1904-03; Refined Sugar, 
Refined from Sugar Cane or Sugar Beets, CDA-95-1904-03 (Final order affirming determination on remand Jan. 30, 
1997); Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Plate, CDA-97-1904-02; Certain Iodinated Contrast Media, CDA-USA-2000-1904-
02 (Remand determination July 10, 2003); Live Swine from Canada, USA-94-1904-01 (Final order affirming determination 
on remand Sept. 27, 1995); Porcelain-on-Steel Cookware, USA-95-1904-01 (Final order affirming determination on 
remand July 19, 1996); Oil Tubular Goods, USA-95-1904-04 (Final order affirming determination on remand Dec. 2, 
1996); Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products, USA-97-1904-03 (Final order affirming determination on remand 
Sept. 13, 1999); Porcelain-on-Steel Cookware (Administrative Review), USA-97-1904-07 (Final order affirming 
determination on remand July 9, 1999); Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products (Administrative Review), USA-
CDA-98-1904-01 (Final order affirming determination on remand Aug. 24, 2001); Brass Sheet and Strip from Canada 
(Administrative Review), USA-CDA-98-1904-03 (Final order affirming determination on remand Nov. 5, 1999); Pure 
Magnesium and Alloy Magnesium from Canada (CVD Sunset Reviews), USA-CDA-2000-1904-07 (Final determination on 
remand January 10, 2003); Flat Coated Steel Products, MEX-94-1904-01 (Final order affirming determination on remand 
April 13, 1998); Cut-to-Length Plate, MEX-94-1904-02 (Final order affirming determination on remand Oct. 30, 1995); 
Rolled Steel Plate, MEX-96-1904-02 (Final order affirming determination on remand Dec. 18, 1998); Hot-Rolled Steel 
Sheet, MEX-96-1904-03 (Final order affirming determination on remand Sept. 15, 1997); High Fructose Corn Syrup, MEX-
USA-98-1904-01 (in progress).    
6 Remand is defined as “to send (a case or claim) back to the court or tribunal from which it came for some further action”: 
see definition of “Remand”, BLACKS’ LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed.) 1296 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 1999). 
7 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 99 (1994) (setting out a a 
typology of transjudicial communication according to form, function and reciprocal engagement); for some recent 
questioning of this in the U.S. domestic context see Sarah K. Harding, Comparative Reasoning and Judicial Review,  28 
YALE J. INT’L L. 409 (2003) (the rejection of foreign law by the U.S. Supreme Court is justified, at least partially, by reasons 
that also help explain its concerns about authority within the American legal system.). 
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 All of this is fascinating - and it is fascinating precisely because it affords us the 
rare opportunity to see the full “panorama” of the law. So often we are concerned with 
what the law is rather than with what the law does. Here, however, we have a chance to 
assess both cause and effect and to remind ourselves why we are doing what we are 
doing. This is important because as time goes on and more and more decisions under Ch. 
19 accumulate, the record of what is done is being forgotten. Agency determinations on 
remand are obscure things.8 They are hard to find, and even if they are found, 
understanding their outcomes and assessing whether they fulfill the aim of binational 
panel procedures is difficult. There is an inevitable tendency to look to the system in 
general and to believe in it without always questioning what it accomplishes. 
 To fully appreciate the situation, however, some background is necessary. Part 
Two is therefore a review of the binational panel process. It examines the panels’ 
remedies within the operation of the Ch. 19 process. Part Three proceeds to describe the 
greater context of compliance. It identifies six factors that shape what panels do. Part 
Four surveys the case law, noting trends and the comparison and contrast of panel 
determinations from the three NAFTA jurisdictions. It also makes observations about the 
abiding influence of national law on the extent of remedial activism, something which is 
widely credited with making Ch. 19 decisions politically palatable. Part Five goes on to 
examine binational panel decisions and national agency determinations in High Fructose 
and Pure Magnesium as examples where the system has been taken to its logical limits 
and where dialogue has effectively come to an end. Finally, Part Six offers some 
                                               
8 Agency decisions on remand under NAFTA Ch. 19 are not yet collected or catalogued in any systematic or centralized 
way. Canadian agency decisions are available at the website of the respective Canadian agency responsible for the 
decision, this being either the Canadian International Trade Tribunal or the Canadian Customs and Revenue Agency. In 
the U.S. some – but not all – remand decisions are available at the Department of Commerce website and some are 
published in the U.S. Federal Register. In Mexico agency decisions are published in the Diario Oficial de la Federación, 
which can be accessed through WESTLAW (database mx-diario). It would be useful for all NAFTA Ch. 19 agency 
decisions on remand to be available on the NAFTA Secretariat website.    
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conclusions about the extent to which the process established under NAFTA Ch. 19 
continues to be valid. 
2. Chapter 19 Binational Panel Review 
 It is an accepted part of negotiating lore that the binational panel system that now 
appears in NAFTA Ch. 19 was originally created at the eleventh hour of the original 
Canada-U.S. Free Trade negotiations in 1987 to respond to Canadian concerns about the 
formidable U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty regime.9 Canada, as the U.S.’s 
largest trading partner, had the most to fear from the assertive use of U.S. antidumping 
and countervailing duties. Its original hope was to convince the U.S. to entirely abolish 
the AD/CVD regime with respect to Canadian products and replace it with a supposedly 
more objective antitrust or competition regime. Canada ultimately failed in this effort and 
had to content itself with a binational panel system of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement (CUSFTA). The system was carried over with minor modifications into 
NAFTA and was subsequently extended to Mexico when it joined NAFTA in 1994. 
 Antidumping involves the imposition of duties beyond conventional tariffs on 
imports that are being sold in a market at less than normal value.10 The adjustment is 
meant to counter the anti-competitive effect of this dumping. Likewise, countervailing 
duties involve the imposition of similar duties on subsidized imports.11 The classic 
distinction between the two kinds of action is that antidumping responds to the behaviour 
                                               
9 MICHAEL HART AT AL., DECISION AT MIDNIGHT: INSIDE THE CANADA-US FREE TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (1994) (“Canada’s 
interest was to establish a new regime which would eliminate or reduce the scope for U.S. industry to use U.S. trade 
remedy legislation to harass Canadian competitors.”) (171) (“The result on trade remedies can be described as a qualified 
success. Canada was prepared to enter into far-reaching commitments that would have put the rules covering so-called 
unfair trade on a much more equitable and predictable footing. This objective proved too rich for the United States, at 
least in 1987.”) (379). 
10 Article VI:2 of GATT 1994 provides that “in order to offset or prevent dumping, a contracting party may levy on any 
dumped product an anti-dumping duty not greater in amount than the margin of dumping in respect of such product.”  
11 Article VI:3 of GATT 1994 provides that “No countervailing duty shall be levied on any product  … in excess of an 
amount equal to the estimated bounty or subsidy determined to have been granted …”.   
 6 
of a private producer whereas countervailing duties are meant to counteract the 
subsidization of goods by a foreign government. If dumping or subsidization is found to 
occur, then national authorities must determine whether that activity is causing or 
threatening to cause “material injury” to a domestic industry. 
 Antidumping and countervailing action therefore involve three key 
determinations: 
1) a finding of either dumping, subsidization, or the threat of either of these, 
2) material injury to a domestic industry, and 
3) a causal link between the activity and the injury.12 
Traditionally, it is only after an affirmative finding on all three points that an order for the 
imposition of duties may be made by a national authority. For this reason an extensive 
body of law and jurisprudence on these points has arisen in NAFTA jurisdictions. It is 
supplemented by a complex, and at times highly peculiar, corpus of administrative 
practice.13 In Canada the Canadian Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA), an affiliate of 
the Department of National Revenue, makes determinations of dumping and 
subsidization while the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT) makes findings of 
injury and causal linkage. In the United States these same functions are performed by the 
U.S. Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) and the U.S. International Trade 
Commission (ITC), respectively. In Mexico all determinations are made by a single 
agency, which until December 2000 was known as the Ministry of Commerce and 
                                               
12 Article VI:1 of GATT 1994 provides that “The contracting parties recognize that dumping, by which products of one 
country are introduced into the commerce of the other country at less than the normal value of the products, is to be 
condemned if it causes or threatens material injury to an established industry … or materially retards the establishment of 
a domestic industry.” 
13 See, for instance, the Canada Regulations under the Special Import Measures Act, Directives, Guidelines and Customs 
Notices. In the U.S. see U.S. Department of Commerce Import Administration Antidumping Manual, which contains 
procedural and technical information from the U.S. Statement of Administrative Act as well as the Administration’s 
Antidumping Regulations (19 C.F.R. 351). In Mexico see regulations issued under the Foreign Trade Act and published in 
the Diario Oficial de la Federación, Annex II (Dec. 30, 1993). 
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Industrial Development (SECOFI) when its name was changed to the Ministry of the 
Economy. 
 The binational panel review system of NAFTA Ch. 19 applies to any one of the 
three final determinations listed above and is meant to replace judicial review in national 
courts. The greatest advantage it offers is a significantly reduced period of review.14  
Under NAFTA Art. 1904(3) a panel’s task is defined as being to assess whether a given 
determination is “in accordance with the law of the importing Party”. The panel is to 
conduct its assessment by applying the domestic standard of review and “the general 
legal principles that a court of the importing Party would apply.”15 The implicit metric of 
NAFTA Ch. 19 review is therefore domestic law, a law which in theory is supposed to 
remain the same as if it were being interpreted and applied by a domestic court. There is 
no recourse to foreign or international law to resolve issues because Ch. 19 envisages 
none.16 The principal innovation of Ch. 19 is the novelty of having nationals and 
foreigners compose the tribunal of final review17, something that presents the possibility 
of an erroneous interpretation of domestic law or adds an extra degree of confirmation to 
the proceedings. Most commentators have seen the binational character of panels in the 
latter sense, suggesting that they enjoy something of the added legitimacy that motivates 
the appointment of judges ad hoc to the bench of the International Court of Justice.18  
                                               
14 Binational panels generally adhere to a 315-day time limit concerning their own decisions. Time limits on further action 
are also significantly reduced, with panels requiring return from national agencies within as little as 15 days. This is 
compared with appeal periods of several months or even years in the domestic court system. 
15 NAFTA Art. 1904(3). 
16 Except, of course, to the extent that foreign or international law already applies within domestic law by virtue of existing 
domestic law principles. 
17 NAFTA Art. 1904(11) provides that “A final determination shall not be reviewed under any judicial review procedures of 
the importing Party … . No Party may provide in its domestic legislation for an appeal from a panel decision to its 
domestic courts.” 
18 Under Art. 31(1) of the ICJ Statute parties before the Court are entitled to appoint a judge to the bench where there is 
no judge of their nationality already sitting. Shabtai Rosenne has observed that this practice allows appointees to 
“represent their countries’ interests in the whole process through which a decision is produced and the reasons 
formulated” and is ultimately “a concession to diplomatic susceptibilities.” See SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE 
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 Proceedings under Ch. 19 must begin with 30 days of the publication of a final 
agency determination.19 Panels are composed of “judges and former judges to the fullest 
extent practicable”, although this has not prevented the appointment of other individuals 
chosen “on the basis of objectivity, reliability, sound judgment and general familiarity 
with international trade law.”20 Panels then conduct proceedings modeled on appellate 
process within a 315-day time limit.21 
 At the end of binational proceedings the panel will normally issue a remedy. The 
remedies that may be granted are now set out in Art. 1904(8), as follows: 
The panel may uphold a final determination, or remand it for action not 
inconsistent with the panel's decision. Where the panel remands a final 
determination, the panel shall establish as brief a time as is reasonable for 
compliance with the remand, taking into account the complexity of the 
factual and legal issues involved and the nature of the panel's decision. In 
no event shall the time permitted for compliance with a remand exceed an 
amount of time equal to the maximum amount of time (counted from the 
date of the filing of a petition, complaint or application) permitted by 
statute for the competent investigating authority in question to make a 
final determination in an investigation. If review of the action taken by the 
competent investigating authority on remand is needed, such review shall 
be before the same panel, which shall normally issue a final decision 
within 90 days of the date on which such remand action is submitted to it. 
This is supplemented by the largely procedural requirements of Rules 73-74 and 77-80 
concerning panel review of action by investigating authorities on remand.22 Apart from 
                                                                                                                                            
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 204 (1985). 
19 NAFTA Art. 1904(4). 
20 NAFTA Annex 1901.2(1). 
21 The NAFTA Ch. 19 Panel Rules are reprinted at 69 Fed. Reg. 8686 (1994). 
22 Rules 73-74 and 77-80  provide as follows: 
 
73. (1) An investigating authority shall give notice of the action taken pursuant to a remand of the panel by filing with the 
responsible Secretariat a Determination on Remand within the time specified by the panel.  
(2) If, on remand, the investigating authority has supplemented the administrative record,  
(a) the investigating authority shall file with the responsible Secretariat an Index listing each item in 
the supplementary remand record, and a copy of each non-privileged item listed in that Index, within 
five days after the date on which the investigating authority filed the Determination on Remand with 
the panel;  
(b) any participant who intends to challenge the Determination on Remand shall file a written 
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submission with respect to the Determination on Remand within 20 days after the date on which the 
investigating authority filed the Index and supplementary remand record; and  
(c) any response to the written submissions referred to in subrule (b) shall be filed by the investigating 
authority, and by any participant supporting the investigating authority, within 20 days after the last 
day on which written submissions in opposition to the Determination on Remand may be filed.  
(3) If, on remand, the investigating authority has not supplemented the record,  
(a) any participant who intends to challenge the Determination on Remand shall file a written 
submission within 20 days after the date on which the investigating authority filed the Determination 
on Remand with the panel; and  
(b) any response to the written submissions referred to in subrule (a) shall be filed by the investigating 
authority, and by any participant filing in support of the investigating authority, within 20 days after the 
last day on which such written submissions may be filed.  
(4) In the case of a panel review of a final determination made in Mexico, where a participant who fails to file a brief under 
rule 57 files a written submission pursuant to subrule (2) or (3), the submission shall be disregarded by the panel.  
(5) If no written submissions are filed under subrule (2)(b) or (3)(a) within the time periods established by these rules, and 
if no motion pursuant to rule 20 is pending, the panel shall, within 10 days after the later of the due date for such written 
submissions and the date of the denial of a motion pursuant to rule 20, issue an order affirming the investigating 
authority's Determination on Remand.  
(6) Where a Determination on Remand is challenged, the panel shall issue a written decision pursuant to rule 72, either 
affirming the Determination on Remand or remanding it to the investigating authority, no later than 90 days after the 
Determination on Remand is filed.  
 
74. In setting the date by which a Determination on Remand shall be due from the investigating authority, the panel shall 
take into account, among other factors,  
(a) the date that any Determination on Remand with respect to the same goods is due from the other 
investigating authority; and  
(b) the effect the Determination on Remand from the other investigating authority might have on the 
deliberations of the investigating authority with respect to the making of a final Determination on 
Remand.  
77. (1) Subject to subrule (2), when a panel issues:  
(a) an order dismissing a panel review under subrule 58(3) or 71(1),  
(b) a decision under rule 72 or subrule 73(6) that is the final action in the panel review, or  
(c) an order under subrule 73(5),  
the panel shall direct the responsible Secretary to issue a Notice of Final Panel Action (model form provided in the 
Schedule) on the eleventh day thereafter.  
(2) Where a motion is filed pursuant to subrule 76(1) regarding a decision referred to in subrule (1)(b), the responsible 
Secretary shall issue the Notice of Final Panel Action on the day on which the panel  
(a) issues a ruling finally disposing of the motion; or  
(b) directs the responsible Secretary to issue the Notice of Final Panel Action, the issuance of which 
shall constitute a denial of the motion.  
78. If no Request for an Extraordinary Challenge Committee is filed, the responsible Secretary shall publish a Notice of 
Completion of Panel Review in the official publications of the involved Parties, effective  
(a) on the day on which a panel is terminated pursuant to subrule 71(2); or  
(b) in any other case, on the 31st day following the date on which the responsible Secretary issues a 
Notice of Final Panel Action.  
79. Where a Request for an Extraordinary Challenge Committee has been filed, the responsible Secretary shall publish a 
Notice of Completion of Panel Review in the official publications of the involved Parties, effective on the day after the day 
referred to in rule 64 or subrule 65(a) of the NAFTA Extraordinary Challenge Committee Rules.  
80. Panelists are discharged from their duties on the day on which a Notice of Completion of Panel Review is effective, or 
on the day on which an Extraordinary Challenge Committee vacates a panel review pursuant to subrule 65(b) of the 
NAFTA Extraordinary Challenge Committee Rules.  
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these provisions there is little else to define what binational panels can do or conversely, 
what national agencies must do in response once a remand order is received. Panels have 
therefore taken it upon themselves to fill the void creatively through the use of a body of 
“instructions”. In doing so they have situated themselves at different points along the 
appellate spectrum between deference and de novo review. Their specific position is 
prompted by a number of factors. 
3. Binational Panels and the Context of Compliance 
 In reviewing the factors that lead binational panels to issue instructions on remand 
and, in turn, national agencies to respond, it is important to begin with what is obvious. 
The most evident factor influencing the remedial role of panels is use of the term “may” 
in the initial sentence of Art. 1904(8). Use of the permissive leads to the question of what 
beyond upholding a final determination or remand could a panel possibly do? The answer 
to this question rests in the panels’ appreciation of their powers. The most likely option 
would be to quash the original determination. This would have the legal effect of voiding 
the original finding and requiring the petitioners to recommence proceedings ab initio 
before the domestic agency. 
 This issue arose in one early Mexican determination where the panel held that it 
did have the power to quash given the applicable Mexican legislation, principally because 
the panel interpreted underlying Mexican law to permit a declaration of nullity.23 
                                               
23 The question of the appropriate remedy in the Mexican context first arose in Imports of Cut-To-Length Plate Products, 
MEX-94-1904-2. The panel was the first to render a decision regarding a Mexican finding, and took considerable care in 
defining the exact standard of review and the remedy flowing from it. Article 238 of the Federal Fiscal Code was originally 
drafted to deal with appeals of income tax determinations. It establishes out five grounds for declaring an administrative 
determination invalid. In applying these grounds, however, two adjacent provisions must be considered. Article 237 
defines the administrative tribunal’s procedural and substantive jurisdiction. Article 239 sets out the three remedies 
available, these being upholding the initial determination, remand, or a declaration of nullity. Evidently the power to 
declare a nullity exceeds the power articulated in NAFTA Art. 1904(8) to merely “uphold or remand”, and it was this issue 
that motivated the panel majority in Cut Length Plate to comment extensively on the remedial options available. The 
majority decision emphasized the direct application of NAFTA “into the corpus of Mexican law without the necessity of 
enabling legislation or judicial action.” While direct applicability provides an express standard of review, this principle had 
to be reconciled with the requirement that a NAFTA panel steps into the shoes of the relevant domestic decision-maker 
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Subsequent binational panels reviewing Mexican determinations have retreated from this 
position, insisting instead that no such power can be found or that it cannot be invoked in 
the circumstances.24 In the Mexican constitutional scheme rules that grant jurisdiction to 
an authority are strictly applied.25 For this reason later panels in the Mexican decisions 
have held that the power to quash is beyond the terminology of Art. 1904(8) since this 
only refers to the power to “uphold” or “remand”, nothing more. While the equivalent 
Mexican court, the Federal Fiscal Tribunal, does have the power to declare the decision 
of an agency a nullity by virtue of Art. 239 of the Mexican Federal Fiscal Code, the 
prevailing view appears to be that the exercise of such a power by binational panels 
                                                                                                                                            
and presumably possesses all the remedies of the domestic body replaced. In coming to its conclusion, the majority 
reasoned that the standard of review consists of the contents of Annex 1911 and “general legal principles that a court of 
the importing Party otherwise would apply to a review of the determination of the competent investigating authority.” 
Annex 1911 might spell out an explicit standard, but this did not foreclose the possibility of looking to Arts. 237 or 239 as 
“general legal principles”. The majority indicated that it felt “compelled to include Articles 237 and 239 within the Mexican 
standard of review” because failure to do so would lead to a serious distortion of standard of review as actually practiced 
by the Fiscal Tribunal.” In other words, to sever the wrongs defined under Art. 238 from the remedies under Art. 239, and 
to impose only the options contained in NAFTA Art. 1904(8), would violate the legislative scheme. 
24 Subsequent cases have been decided differently. Some have referred only to Art. 238 and NAFTA Art. 1904(8), 
implicitly denying the application of Art. 239. Others have been clearer in their preference for NAFTA Art. 1904(8)’s 
exclusivity. In Antidumping Investigation of the Government of Mexico into Imports of Flat Coated Steel Products, MEX-
94-1904-01, the panel mentioned the origins in arbitral practice of Ch. 19 procedures and observed that “[l]ike any 
international arbitral panel, the jurisdiction of a binational panel is limited.”24 From this central premise it went on to 
emphasize the importance of consent to international jurisdiction, which in Mexico had been expressly restricted to Art. 
238. Though Art. 238 might be ill-suited to the task, the panel stated that it lacked jurisdiction “to declare a challenged 
resolution to be a nullity. ... Jurisdiction to declare a “nullity” does not exist under NAFTA Art. 1904(8).” It continued: 
 
We fully appreciate the desirability of having panels and national courts decide cases in a similar 
manner, as a means of promoting consistency and uniformity in decisions. We understand that the 
Federal Fiscal Tribunal would apply Articles 238 and 239 together, and in appropriate circumstances 
might nullify a Final Determination. However, if the Parties to NAFTA wished this panel to have the 
authority to grant the same remedies to the parties before it that the Federal Fiscal Tribunal may 
grant under Art. 239, they presumably would have included Article 239 in the standard of review, and 
would have written NAFTA Article 1904(8) differently, so as to avoid conflict between Article 1904(8) 
and Article 239. 
 
... In other words, we are convinced that under the current text of NAFTA this panel does not have the 
same jurisdiction and the same powers as have been conferred on the Federal Fiscal Tribunal. We 
must act within, and only within, the express limits of jurisdiction and powers conferred on us. 
 
Therefore, instead of remanding the case to the Mexican administrative agency, SECOFI, with a direction to terminate the 
proceeding, the panel declared “illegal, under Article 238, Section I of the Fiscal Code, all administrative determinations 
within the Final Determination that concern Inland, declare[d] that those administrative determinations may not be given 
any legal effect” and ordered SECOFI to observe certain conditions in future determinations regarding the case. 
Subsequent panels have held in a like manner. See Imports of Polystrene and Impact Crystal from the U.S., MEX-94-
1904-03; Imports of Hot-Rolled Steel from Canada, MEX-96-1904-03; and Imports of Rolled Steel Plate from Canada, 
MEX-96-1904-02. 
25 Review of the Final Determination of the Antidumping Investigation in High Fructose Corn Syrup, MEX-USA-98-1904-
01, para. 286 (Aug. 3, 2001). 
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“would constitute an undue expansion of … the Panel’s jurisdiction and powers.”26 That 
interpretation may appear to be a narrow reading, particularly when use of the permissive 
and the absence of any other exclusive language in Art. 1904(8) are considered, but it 
must be balanced against the fact that the other NAFTA parties likewise circumscribed 
panels’ remedial jurisdiction. Under NAFTA Art. 1904(1) binational panels are said to 
replace domestic courts, yet they have not been granted the full remedial powers of 
equivalent domestic tribunals. In Canada the Federal Court’s full powers of redress were 
not made available.27 Likewise, they do not have the equitable powers of American 
courts.28 Moreover, binational panels were not conferred the power to review their own 
decisions except in cases of accidental oversight, inaccuracy or omission.29    
 Notwithstanding these limits, panels have occasionally gone beyond the strict 
wording of NAFTA Art. 1904(8) and done more than simply confirm or remand agency 
decisions. This practice – a practice dictated by circumstances of agency recalcitrance 
and by the binational panel’s overarching appreciation of the need for effectiveness in its 
process – was evident under the Canada-U.S. FTA where several commentators observed 
that by not permitting domestic agencies to adduce new evidence and re-open the 
administrative record, FTA binational panels in some cases “in effect used the remand 
process to terminate review by “instructing” the agency to overturn “unsustainable” 
                                               
26 Ibid., para. 287. 
27 For instance, under s. 18 of the Canadian Federal Court Act the Trial Division of the Federal Court has the power “to 
issue an injunction, writ of certiorari, writ of prohibition, writ of mandamus or writ of quo warranto, or grant declaratory 
relief, against any federal board, commission or other tribunal“ and under s. 18.1 it may also “(a) order a federal board, 
commission or other tribunal to do any act or thing it has unlawfully failed or refused to do or has unreasonably delayed in 
doing; or (b) declare invalid or unlawful, or quash, set aside or set aside and refer back for determination in accordance 
with such directions as it considers to be appropriate, prohibit or restrain, a decision, order, act or proceeding of a federal 
board, commission or other tribunal.” 
28 Under 28 U.S.C. 1585 (1994), for instance, the U.S. Court of International Trade is given “all the powers in law and 
equity” of a U.S. District Court. One example of such equitable jurisdiction is the compulsion of a government officer or 
employee to perform a duty (28 U.S.C. 1361 (1994)).  
29 NAFTA Panel Rules 75-76. 
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conclusions.”30 For instance, in Softwood Lumber I the binational panel issued a second 
remand with the following directions: 
Since Commerce has been unable to provide a rational legal basis for a 
finding that the provincial stumpage programs are specific and in light of 
the efficiency with which the Panel review is intended to resolve these 
disputes, we therefore remand this issue to Commerce for a determination 
that the provincial stumpage programs are not provided to a specific 
enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or industries.31 
Here the binational panel dictated a specific result to the national agency – a finding that 
the scheme under scrutiny lacked specificity, a necessary component to any 
determination that there is a “subsidy”32 – and therefore effectively terminated the 
proceeding. As will be seen, similar pronouncements have also been made under 
NAFTA. 
 A second indication that binational panels have been left to develop a responsive 
remedial role, and therefore to locate themselves more centrally along the spectrum of 
appellate activism, is intimated by the remaining terminology and structure of Art. 
1904(8). The article contemplates, for instance, that national agencies will take “action 
not inconsistent with the panel’s decision”, that they will actively comply with the 
decision taking into account “the nature of the panel’s decision”, and that the decision on 
remand may be subject to further review. Further support for this position comes from 
comes from reference in Art. 1904(3) to panels’ application of “the general legal 
principles that a court of the importing Party otherwise would apply” in such a review 
and from mention in Art. 1904(15) that each party shall amend its law so as to “give 
                                               
30 DENIS LEMIEUX & ANA STUHEC, REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION UNDER NAFTA 13 (1998). 
31 Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada (Countervailing Duty), USA-92-1904-01, p. 51 (Dec. 17, 1993). 
32 A subsidy is defined under Art. I of the WTO Subsidies Agreement as involving a financial contribution of a government, 
or income or price support, and the existence of some benefit to the recipient. In addition, by virtue of Subsidies 
Agreement Arts. I:2 and II the subsidy may only be challenged under WTO rules where it meets certain criteria for 
specificity set out in Art. II (where, for instance, it is limited to a certain enterprise or is being used by a limited number of 
enterprises).  
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effect to a final panel decision that a refund is due”. All of these references, both subtle 
and apparent, suggest that far from being a “yes-or-no” review, there is readily foreseen 
in the treaty some degree of substantive content to the panel’s decision-making. 
 A third factor that must be taken into account is the six years of experience with 
remediation and remand under Ch. XIX of the Canada-U.S. FTA.33 While it remains true 
that decisions under both Ch. XIX and 19 are binding only on the parties to the dispute, 
there is the inevitable tendency for panels to look back and consider remedial behaviour 
in prior instances.34 The very fact that a vigourous pattern of panel practice had already 
arisen under the FTA evidently motivates and helps to confirm the remedial conclusions 
of panels under NAFTA. 
 To the above factors must be added elements that constrain and limit panel 
behaviour. At a domestic level there is the pre-existing relationship between national 
agencies and courts of review. This is not always a harmonious one. Agencies in all three 
NAFTA countries have something of a history of antagonism with the courts, courts 
                                               
33 Cases under the Canada-U.S. FTA involving remand were: Beer, CDA-91-1904-01, CDA-91-1904-02; Certain Machine 
Tufted Carpeting, CDA-92-1904-01 (dumping), CDA-92-1904-02 (injury) (Final order affirming determination on remand 
April 21, 1994); Gypsum Board, CDA-93-1904-01 (Final order affirming determination on remand March 24, 1994); Cold-
Rolled Steel Sheet, CDA-93-1904-08; Red Raspberries from Canada, USA-89-1904-01; Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork, 
USA-89-1904-06; New Steel Rail, USA-89-1904-07; Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Pork, USA-89-1904-11; Self-Propelled 
Bituminous Paving Equipment, USA-90-1904-01 (Final order affirming determination on remand Dec. 27, 1992); Live 
Swine from Canada, USA-91-1904-03 (CVD Review 88-89), USA-91-1904-04 (CVD Review 89-90) (Final order affirming 
determination on remand July 16, 1993); Softwood Lumber, USA-92-1904-01, USA-92-1904-02 (Panel dismissed panel 
review Jan. 27, 1995); Pure and Alloy Magnesium, USA-92-1904-03; Magnesium from Canada, USA-92-1904-05/06; 
Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products, USA-93-1904-03 (Final order affirming determination on remand July 11, 
1995); Cut-to-Length Steel Plate, USA-93-1904-04 (Final order affirming determination on remand July 11, 1995). 
34 A good example is the panel’s pronouncement I concerning the extent of its remedial jurisdiction in High Fructose Corn 
Syrup, MEX-USA-98-1904-01, para. 287 (Aug. 3, 2001), where it referred to past practice and the behaviour of panels in 
U.S. and Canadian cases: 
The Complainants have argued, however, that this Panel must consider Article 239 of the FFC as an 
integral part of the standard of review. It is noteworthy that a binational panel in a previous case 
accepted this standard of review, and four other rejected it3. This Panel finds that reasoning 
concerning the standard of review of the majority of the panels shall prevail the inclusion of Article 
239 in the standard of review would constitute an undue expansion of it’s the Panel’s jurisdiction and 
powers. Further, panels in the United States and Canada do not have the authority to annul a 
resolution of an IA. This Panel is subject to the jurisdiction and powers established by NAFTA Article 
1904.8, which empowers it to affirm SECOFI’s final determination, or to remand it for action not 




being institutions with arguably greater powers but lesser specialized expertise. It is not 
surprising that this attitude should reassert itself in a new setting. National agencies have 
reacted to panel decisions in most instances the way they might to a domestic court, 
which does not necessarily mean deference. Rather, there is often a tone of jealous pride 
in further explanations or in detailing reasoning that fundamentally will not change. 
Agencies seem acutely aware of the expertise they possess and of the traditional 
deference shown to them by domestic courts. Read carefully, some agency re-
determinations appear almost to be a review of the panel decision itself. In other words, a 
subtle inversion of function seems to occur. 
 This happens, in part, because under each system of domestic law there are 
functions that are exclusive to one level of decision-maker versus another. In all three 
NAFTA countries judicial review is supposed to be primarily a law-driven as opposed to 
a fact-driven exercise. The aim is to ensure that national agencies have properly identified 
the law and applied that law to the facts. This stance is driven by the panel’s lack of 
means to test the facts and also by consciousness of its appellate function. Any attempt to 
go beyond that to, say, make a new finding of fact would exceed its mandate. 
 There are also remedial principles that limit what panels can do by way of follow-
up. Again, in all three NAFTA countries there are constitutional doctrines which suggest 
that a tribunal purporting to retain jurisdiction to oversee the implementation of a remedy 
after an order has been issued may be acting inappropriately in two respects. First, 
repeated invocation of its powers may extend the tribunal’s jurisdiction beyond its proper 
role, thereby breaching the separation of powers. Second, by acting after it has exhausted 
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its jurisdiction a tribunal will breach the functus officio doctrine.35 Although it is open to 
question whether such constitutional doctrines might be transposed mutatis mutandi into 
NAFTA Ch. 19, a context which more accurately approximates administrative review, it 
is arguable that they inform what a panel believes it is empowered to do, particularly 
since panels are supposed to “step into the shoes” of domestic courts.    
 Yet another factor influencing, and to some extent limiting, the context of 
compliance is the standard of review. Obviously the degree to which panels will act is 
influenced by their appreciation of the law and facts. The general standard is set out in 
NAFTA Art. 1904(3) which requires that: 
The panel shall apply the standard of review set out in Annex 1911 and the 
general legal principles that a court of the importing Party otherwise 
would apply to a review of a determination of the competent investigating 
authority. 
Annex 1911 further specifies the particular standard of review for each country.36 These 
statutory provisions obscure to some degree the exact standard applicable in certain 
situations due to the accretion of precedent around statutory wording. In Canada, for 
instance, the relevant standard of review varies depending on whether the matter under 
review is an issue of jurisdiction, in which case the relevant standard is “correctness”, 
versus on an issue of law, where it is “patent unreasonableness”, or one of fact, in which 
case it is one of “no evidence” or the “wrong principle”.37 In the U.S. final determinations 
of antidumping or countervailing duty determinations are subject to review if they are 
“unsupported by substantial evidence on the record or otherwise not in accordance with 
                                               
35 In Canada see Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), Supreme Court of Canada File No. 28807 
(Nov. 6, 2003). 
36 This is ss. 18.1(4) of the Federal Court Act for Canada, Article 238 of the Federal Fiscal Code for Mexico, and ss. 
516(A)(1)(A)-(B) of the Tariff Act of 1930 for the United States. 
37 For a discussion of the Canadian standards see DENIS LEMIEUX & ANA STUHEC, REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 
UNDER NAFTA 35-39 (1998).  
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the law.”38 Finally, the standard of review in Mexico permits review or nullification of a 
decision where it is made “in excess of jurisdiction.”39 Regardless of these complexities, 
issues involving the standard of review in remediation have been rare. 
 A final factor which bears on the remedial jurisdiction of binational panels is the 
issue of enforceability and the lack of any formal precedential effect. NAFTA Art. 
1904(9) expressly states that “The decision of a panel under this Article shall be binding 
on the involved Parties …”, and this statement, combined with the functional observation 
that binational panels are supposed to replace judicial review, should suggest that panels’ 
decisions are indeed of legal force. That conclusion is undercut, however, by the fact that 
no NAFTA party has made binational panel decisions directly enforceable in domestic 
courts in the same way that decisions under NAFTA Art. 1136(4) are and by the 
existence of a separate state-to-state enforcement mechanism under NAFTA Art. 1905.40 
National agencies have shown themselves to be conscious of this fact.41 
 Each of the above factors – the pre-existing legal context, permissiveness and a 
certain liberalism in panel practice, restrictive doctrines, the standard of review and the 
                                               
38 In the case of the United States the standard of review requires a binational panel to “hold unlawful any determination, 
finding, or conclusion found … to be unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance 
with the law.” The term “substantial evidence” has been defined by the U.S. Supreme Court as “more than a mere 
scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 
229 (1938)). . For discussion of the U.S. standard see DENIS LEMIEUX & ANA STUHEC, REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 
UNDER NAFTA 39-41 (1998). 
39 The Mexican standard is set out in Art. 238 of the Mexican Federal Fiscal Code and includes general principles of 
Mexican law. Thus, the failure of the relevant Mexican agency to comply with general constitutional and legal principles 
would take the agency beyond its jurisdiction. For discussion of the Mexican standard see DENIS LEMIEUX & ANA STUHEC, 
REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION UNDER NAFTA 41-43 (1998). 
40 Under Art. 1905, which is entitled “Safeguarding the Panel Review System”, NAFTA parties may seek to suspend the 
application of binational panel procedures where a NAFTA country’s domestic law prevents the establishment of a panel, 
prevents the panel from rendering a final decision, prevents implementation of the decision, or results in a failure to 
provide opportunity to review a final determination by a panel or court. 
41 For instance, in its remand determination in Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Canada, 
USA-CDA-98-1904-01, 66 Fed. Reg. 52095-03 (Oct. 12, 2001) the U.S. Department of Commerce observed: 
 
We note that the NAFTA Panel’s ruling does not establish binding precedent and that the Department 
believes its interpretation of these statutory rules is reasonable and consistent with the intent of 
Congress. We also note that, in future reviews, the Department intends to pursue an examination of 
market price more fully to ensure appropriate application of the test, consistent with subsections 
773(f)(2) and (f)(3) of the Act. 
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lack of enforceability – together contribute to the particular position of panels on the 
spectrum of judicial review. Initially it is a limited one. As the process of remand 
proceeds, however, it can become more involved. What is noteworthy about Ch. 19 
remediation in general is the way in which it focuses on correct procedures to be 
followed, not the particular result to be achieved. The overwhelming impression is one of 
a commitment to ensuring fair methods for arriving at a decision instead of at a particular 
decision itself. Nevertheless, in practice panel prescriptions can be of a more positive 
nature and, when combined with the power of sequential remand, can require terms that 
effectively produce a specific conclusion. An examination of several Ch. 19 cases gives 
some idea of how this occurs.    
4. Binational Panels and Agency Practice on Remand 
 A number of cases remanded under Ch. 19 have involved what amounts to 
clarification of decision-making. Remand effectively serves as an opportunity for the 
national agency to elaborate upon reasoning that it previously failed or omitted to 
provide, without changing the result in any significant way. One might legitimately 
object to agencies having a second chance to get things right, but it has to be recalled that 
Ch. 19 is an administrative context, not a criminal one. Agencies have the right to err in 
minor ways so long as this does not impugn the essential integrity of their decisions. 
Consequently panel instructions may indirectly suggest modification of the outcome, but 
without any possible alternatives to base itself upon, a panel is effectively confined to 
questioning the agency’s reasoning and to confirming its result. 
 This was evident, for instance, in Synthetic Baler Twine42 where the panel 
remanded a Canadian Customs and Revenue Agency finding that dumping was likely to 
                                               
42 CDA-94-1904-02 (April 10, 1995). 
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cause material injury to the production in Canada of like goods, with instructions to 
identify evidence in the record that established the likelihood of injury or, failing that, to 
reopen the administrative record to obtain the required evidence necessary to support 
such a finding. After concluding its re-determination the CCRA was able to observe that 
“this additional evidence confirms the Tribunal’s finding … that the dumping of synthetic 
baler twine, originating in or exported from the United States, was likely to continue and 
to cause material injury to the production in Canada of like goods.”43 The panel 
subsequently confirmed the re-determination. 
 Another example of explanation and precision is Contrast Media44, where the 
panel sought an indication as to why certain movement costs and profits were not 
deducted from a substitute export price of goods from the U.S.. The substitute goods 
were moved from a warehouse in Memphis to Puerto Rico prior to being exported to 
Canada. The agency’s response to the panel on remand was unexceptional: the CCRA 
explained that such costs are simply “part of the costs of the goods sold and impacts on 
the normal value and on the profitability of the goods sold in the domestic market.” 
Likewise on the issue of profits, the CCRA stated that “[i]n view of the fact that the profit 
is an integral part of the normal value of any goods, [the agency] is of the view that it is 
not appropriate to deduct the profit earned [by the exporter].”45 Again, the panel 
confirmed the agency’s re-determination.46 
                                               
43 Synthetic Baler Twine With a Knot Strength of 200 lbs or Less, originating in or Exported from the United States of 
America, CCRA No. NQ-93-003 (June 9, 1995). 
44 Certain Iodinated Contrast Media, CDA-USA-2000-1904-01 (May 26, 2003). 
45 Certain Iodinated Contrast Media, Determination on Remand, p. 26 (June 25, 2003). 
46 In the process of remand binational panels have also occasionally identified additional issues for further agency review. 
In Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Plate46, for example, the panel remanded to the Canadian International Trade Tribunal the 
issue of whether separate findings and reasons in antidumping investigations were required for Mexican products by 
virtue of NAFTA. There are also cases where the national agency itself recognizes its error or failure in proceedings 
before the panel and itself requests remand in order to address its mistakes.46 This is where errors can be caught. The 
relative speed and simplicity of proceeding before binational panels as opposed to judicial review makes them attractive in 
this respect. 
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 At times, however, remand results can be specific because binational panel 
decisions are themselves specific. Specificity leaves a national agency with limited 
alternatives if it wants to be seen to be in compliance with a panel report. In Porcelain-
on-Steel Cookware from Mexico47, for instance, the original Department of Commerce 
determination was issued in August 1997 and several producers covered by the order 
challenged the results before a binational panel. The panel confirmed the Department’s 
findings but remanded in one respect: whether the Department should utilize the indirect 
selling expense ratio submitted by Yamaka China in determining Yamaka’s indirect 
selling expenses on its sales of porcelain-on-steel cookware produced by ENASA. In 
particular, the panel directed the Department: 
(1) to determine whether the Department did make a “ministerial error”, 
that is, a minor error of a clerical nature; 
(2) if it did, to correct the error; and 
(3) in making the correction, to consider comments from the parties based 
on the proper calculation, specifically address those comments in its 
remand determination, and explain the basis for the correction in detail. 
 
The specificity of the pronouncement is striking. The Department subsequently 
determined that its use of an indirect selling expense ratio for an affiliated importer, 
Global Imports, rather than one from an affiliate and reseller, Yamaka, was in fact in 
error and proceeded to correct it.48 
 In some instances more than one remand is necessary to get things right. Here it 
appears that panels can become somewhat more assertive in their remedial jurisdiction. In 
Circular Welded Non-Alloy Steel Pipe from Mexico49, for instance, the issue was what 
products from a single manufacturer, Galvak, were covered by a Department of 
                                               
47 USA-97-1904-07 (May 3, 1999). 
48 64 Fed. Reg. 42916-01 (Aug. 6, 1999). 
49 USA-MEX-98-1904-05 (may 16, 2002). 
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Commerce finding of dumping. This question had been left ambiguous in the original 
form of the finding, where the Department had endeavoured to articulate a broad rule 
concerning all mechanical tubing.50 Upon remand the Department did further specify the 
subject of the order, but not enough.51 In a second decision the binational panel observed 
that “[t]he Department, through its Remand Results, addressed the lack of clear dividing 
lines by finding that only certain products possessing specific characteristics are included 
in the scope of the order.” It also observed, however, that “the Redetermination fails to 
answer the fundamental question: Do the products that Galvak intends to export meet the 
dimension and characteristics of ATSM-53 fence tubing?” In its second re-determination 
the Department was able to conclude: 
Given this instruction, it is necessary for the Department first to define 
what is and what is not mechanical tubing. The Department has attempted 
to do so on a reasonable basis, supported by the facts of the case … Based 
on the evidence on the record, and in conformity with the Panel’s 
instructions, the Department determines that Galvak’s tubing, stencilled as 
ASTM A-787, which is not manufactured to the same standard diameters, 
wall thicknesses, and lengths of pipe manufactured to ASTM A-53 or 
fence tubing, is mechanical tubing, and therefore excluded from the Order. 
However, Galvak’s tubing, stencilled as ASTM A-787, but manufactured 
to the standard diameters, wall thickness, and length of pipe manufactured 
to ASTM-A-53 or fence tubing, is not mechanical tubing, and therefore is 
included in the Order.52   
 Circular Welded Non-Alloy Steel Pipe from Mexico raises the question of how far 
panels are willing to go to undertake more positive relief, that is, to create or identify 
something new? One example is Live Swine from Canada53 which involved review of a 
U.S. Department of Commerce countervailing duty order on live swine from Canada. The 
                                               
50 Scope Ruling Memorandum to Joseph A. Spetrini (DAS, Enforcement Group III) from Richard Weible (Office Director, 
AD/CVD Enforcement Group III) (Nov. 19, 1998). NAFTA Secretariat, Adm. Record Pub. Doc. 9. 
51 In its original re-determination of March 7, 2003, the Department determined that “some tubing produced by Galvak to 
ASTM A-787 may be within the scope of the Order. Specifically, tubing which conforms to the dimension and 
characteristics of ASTM A-53 and fence tubing is included within the scope of the Order.” 
52 Final Scope Ruling on Galvak, S.A. de C.V. Merchanise, Antidumping Order on Circular Welded Non-Alloy Steel Pipe 
from Mexico, p. 8 (Jun 16, 2003). 
53 USA-94-1904-01 (May 30, 1995). 
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petitioners challenged Commerce’s denial of separate treatment for old and heavy swine, 
known as “sows and boars”, and for a category of young swine known as “weanlings”. 
Previous Commerce determinations had, in fact, allowed the creation of a product-
specific duty rate for sows and boars, as well as for weanlings, but these rates had later 
been either revoked or rescinded by the Department. The Live Swine binational panel 
ruled that Commerce did not adduce any new evidence to sustain its change of position 
and, moreover, had conducted a flawed legal analysis. The panel therefore remanded, 
with directions to: 
I. Reinstate the Sows and Boars subclass and determine a separate CVD 
rate for it; and; 
 
II. Consider Pryme’s application for a subclass for Weanlings, employing 
the same criteria used in creating the Sows and Boars subclass, and as 
appropriate calculate a CVD rate for such subclass, explaining in detail 
any reasons that may be found to preclude the establishment of a 
Weanling subclass or the calculation of a separate CVD rate for such 
subclass.54 
On remand the Department did this.55 What is important to observe is what the panel 
chose to do. It directed the re-instatement of a pre-existing category found to have been 
wrongly revoked and the creation of a new one that had lapsed but that should have 
properly existed. There was no question about the technical feasibility of either class, and 
therefore no question of the panel’s ability to appreciate technical data in order to fashion 
a new class, so the direction simply required, in a sense, a return to some pre-existing 
situation. Live Swine from Canada illustrates just how panels are circumscribed by their 
powers as to the positive relief they can offer.   
 There are also situations where the panel decision’s ultimate effect is to terminate 
                                               
54 Ibid., p. 15. 
55 A final order affirming the agency’s determination on remand was issued by the binational panel on Sept. 27, 1995. 
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the proceedings. In Machine Tufted Carpets the panel on remand directed the CITT to 
determine whether dumping, in and of itself, had caused material injury in the past or was 
likely to do so in future and to demonstrate the rational basis for such a determination by 
detailed analysis, including specific analysis requested by the panel. In conducting its 
first re-determination the Tribunal considered that a comparison of actual price 
movements of imported and domestic carpet could be derived by focusing on specific 
companies that were comparable rather than the full range of companies included in the 
original examination. Having chosen two companies to focus its attention on the Tribunal 
then concluded that conditions promoting antidumping were likely to persist some time 
into the future in the absence of antidumping duties. Upon return to the panel, however, 
this reasoning was evidently insufficient. Focusing on a small number of companies was 
flawed. This was because information from one of the two companies focused upon had 
not been tested by cross-examination or any other means during the Tribunal’s inquiry. 
The Tribunal therefore concluded, on further remand, that neither of the two sets of 
figures was sufficiently reliable to support a determination of past or present material 
injury. This led to revocation of the antidumping duty order in that case in toto. 
 What appears important from a remedial point of view is the judicious mix of 
positive and negative relief, or as seen in Live Swine from Canada, for action that has the 
characteristics of both. Even more important, perhaps, is the existence of a mechanism by 
which to measure final determinations, namely in the form of binational panel 
confirmation. The perspective of outside observers injects a further degree of objectivity 
into the determination when existing interpretations are insufficient. While panels 
maintain a hands-off approach to implementation, they remain ready to correct should a 
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complainant believe it is aggrieved by action taken on remand. 
 Nevertheless, panel-agency relationships are not always so unexceptional or 
harmonious. There are instances where national agencies appear to be at odds with panels 
and where they are able to bury issues through qualification of findings and skilful 
presentation of the evidence. Their re-interpretation of panel decisions, in particular, 
appears emblematic of the quiet skirmishing that can go on under NAFTA Ch. 19. In 
Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Canada the issues arose 
out of administrative reviews of antidumping orders originally made in 1993. One case 
went before a binational panel concerning review for the period August 1, 1994 – July 
31, 1995 (Carbon Steel I)56, the other concerning review for the period August 1, 1995 – 
July 31, 1996 (Carbon Steel II).57 Both cases involved common elements that are most 
conveniently discussed at the outset. It will be recalled that in determining whether goods 
are being sold at less than fair value, and therefore “dumped”, a comparison is made 
between the export price and the “normal value”. This normal value is ordinarily the 
price at which the foreign product is first sold for consumption in the exporting country 
in normal commercial quantities. Occasionally, however, no normal value is available 
due to the lack of ordinary sales or to some other anomaly. In such circumstances 
national laws now permit the use of substitute measures of normal value through the use 
of cost of production figures, constructed values or other composite calculations. 
 In U.S. law cost of production figures and constructed values are normally 
calculated on the basis of records of the exporter or producer of the merchandise, but the 
Department of Commerce must consider “all available evidence on the proper allocation 
                                               
56 USA-97-1904-3 (Sept. 13, 1999). 
57 USA-CDA-98-1904-01 (March 20, 2001). 
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of costs …”. This is provided for by s. 773(f)(1) of the Tariff Act of 1930. In addition, 
calculations made on these bases are subject to “transactions disregard” and “major 
input” rules. The first of these rules, set out in s. 773(f)(2) of the Tariff Act of 1930, 
allows transactions between affiliates to be disregarded for the purposes of calculation if 
the amount representing any element of value does not fairly reflect the amount usually 
reflected in sales of merchandise. The second rule, set out in s. 773(f)(3) of the Tariff Act 
of 1930, allows transactions to be disregarded and substitutes based on the cost of 
production to be used where the Department of Commerce has reasonable grounds to 
believe or suspect that an amount represented as the value of a major input is less than the 
cost of producing such an input. 
 In Carbon Steel I, Stelco alleged that the value of certain coating services 
performed by a Stelco affiliate, Baycoat, had to be fully accounted for in the antidumping 
investigation. The problem, as Stelco saw it, was that the Department attributed certain 
Baycoat profits to Stelco without properly deducting costs arising from the making of 
those profits. The binational panel agreed and instructed the Department to reconsider 
Stelco’s costs under the statutory standard for the cost of production.58 At the same time 
it also ruled that the major input and transaction disregard rules were inapplicable in the 
case.59 
 The Department therefore issued a re-determination in which it decided not to 
adjust for the transfer of profits. Stelco again challenged this and in January 1999 the 
panel again remanded the review to the Department for the second time to reconsider the 
calculation of the transfer price, and to take account of all the evidence on the record. On 
                                               
58 This is provided for by s. 773(f)(1) of the U.S. Tariff Act of 1930, as discussed in the text. 
59 See ss. 773(f)(2) and (f)(3) of the Tariff Act of 1930. 
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this second examination the Department reopened the record and verified the new 
information submitted by Stelco to ensure that the record contained all of the information 
necessary. In the second remand determination, the Department explained that there was 
a difference between Baycoat remitted and recorded profits as well as Baycoat profits on 
amounts charged to Stelco. Because remitted profits could not be tied to any specific 
invoiced transactions, the Department was in the habit of deeming all Baycoat profits as 
belonging to Stelco rather than dividing them between Stelco and Baycoat’s other owner. 
On the second remand the Department therefore made adjustments to the transfer price 
based on an allocated amount of the profits earned by Baycoat on Stelco job orders. In 
September 1999 the panel upheld the Department’s second remand determination. 
 In Carbon Steel II, the central issue was the valuation to be given to certain 
coating and painting services supplied to Stelco by partly owned affiliates, Baycoat and 
Z-Line, pursuant to major input and transaction disregard rules. Under the Department’s 
practice the valuation was conducted at the highest of the three valuations: (1) the transfer 
price between unaffiliated parties, (2) the market price for the transaction (which could 
not be calculated in that instance) and (3) the affiliate’s cost of producing the particular 
service. In response to a Commerce Department questionnaire Stelco only indicated (3), 
but the Department used a distinct methodology, increasing the reported cost of services 
by the weighted average difference between (1) and (3). The Department determined that 
these transfer prices were above the affiliated supplier’s cost of production. It therefore 
used this new value when calculating the normal value of Stelco’s production. 
 In March 2001 a binational panel remanded in the matter with fairly specific 
instructions: 
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(1) recalculate Stelco’s cost of production, taking into account the year-
end return of profits to Stelco, providing the method by which the 
Department recalculated the cost of production [and therefore ultimately 
the normal value], and explain this methodology in light of the statute and 
other relevant legislation; 
(2) reevaluate the application of s. 773(f)(3) of the Act in light of the 
requirement that the Department adjust the transfer price, as above; 
(3) to correct any errors on the imputed credit expenses. 
 
In July 2001 the Department issued its final remand results, recalculating Stelco’s cost of 
production by taking into account year-end return of profits to Stelco from affiliates 
Baycoat and Z-Line. The panel had found that the Department “did not fairly reflect” the 
amount of cost usually reflected in sales, which was the invoice price less profits returned 
from Baycoat. The panel further found that even if the Department was entitled to rely on 
the invoice price paid by Stelco, rather than the invoice price adjusted for the profits 
remitted from Baycoat, the Department did not establish that it had taken due account of 
all the material factors in arriving at a reasonable calculation of costs. 
 The Department here did something very interesting. It noted that in light of the 
panel’s statement remanding for the Department the task of comparing Baycoat’s transfer 
price without profits to the Cost of Production: 
we interpreted the Panel’s ruling to mean that, pursuant to the major input 
rule, the Department is to ensure that the value of the major inputs used to 
calculate Stelco’s COP are not below the cost of producing such inputs. In 
the Final Remand Results, we recalculated Stelco’s COP for the subject 
merchandise based upon the adjusted transfer. Where the Department 
found that the adjusted transfer price value was less than Baycoat and Z-
Line’s respective costs of producing such inputs, the Department used the 
COP for such inputs, pursuant to the major input rule. 
These “interpretative” comments appear to qualify the panel’s decision, narrowing the 
ambit of what the Department was required to do. Furthermore, in a brief, but telling, 
passage Commerce expressed its continuing resistance to the panel’s methodology: 
We note that the NAFTA Panel’s ruling does not establish binding 
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precedent and that the Department believes its interpretation of these 
statutory rules is reasonable and consistent with the intent of Congress. 
We also note that, in future reviews, the Department intends to pursue an 
examination of market price more fully to ensure appropriate application 
of the test, consistent with subsections 773(f)(2) and (f)(3) of the Act.60 
 
In August 2001 the binational panel affirmed this re-determination. 
5. “Two Strikes and You’re Out”: High Fructose and Pure Magnesium  
 Cases examined so far have resulted in either facial or substantive compliance. 
Compliance is not always so automatic, however. Agency recalcitrance and resistance 
can take a variety forms. To return to the metaphor of dialogue, there are cases under Ch. 
19 where it appears that no understanding has been reached between panels and national 
agencies about what needs to be done and where, consequently, remand degenerates into 
a “conversation of contempt”, that is, a situation where panels and agencies simply repeat 
the same words to each other without genuinely addressing the substantive issues 
involved.  
 A good example of this phenomenon is ongoing in Pure Magnesium61, a case 
which arose from “sunset review”, or a review conducted upon termination, of certain 
antidumping duties. The duties were originally imposed on magnesium produced by 
Norsk Hydro Canada Inc. (NCHI) in Canada and exported to the U.S.. The order itself 
was set to expire in 2000 and was therefore preceded by a sunset review conducted by the 
Department of Commerce to determine whether the duties should remain in place. 
International law provides that any duty is to be terminated five years from the time it is 
first imposed in order to prevent the duty from becoming an anticompetitive barrier. This 
is unless national authorities determine that expiration “would be likely to lead to 
                                               
60 See Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Canada, USA-CDA-98-1904-01, 66 F.R. 52095-03 
(Oct. 12, 2001). 
61 Pure Magnesium from Canada (Final Results of the Sunset Review of Antidumping Order on Pure Magnesium from 
Canada), USA-CAN-00-1904-06. 
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continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury.”62 
 In its first determination on the matter in July 2000 Commerce found that 
revocation of the duty would be likely to lead to the continuation or recurrence of 
dumping, principally because declining imports signalled a slowdown in the U.S. pure 
magnesium industry that new imports would be sure to exacerbate.63 The Government of 
Quebec then took the matter to a Ch. 19 panel.64 The panel subsequently rejected 
Commerce’s finding, concluding that Commerce acted contrary to law when it refused to 
find that good cause exists “based solely on declining imports.”65 The panel therefore 
instructed Commerce to reconsider the GOQ’s “good cause” claims related to price, cost, 
the market or other economic factors that might affect the sunset determination as set 
forth in the Act and the Department’s decision to report the investigation rate as the 
margin of dumping likely to prevail if the order was revoked.66 
 On its first re-determination Commerce referred to its Sunset Policy Bulletin to 
justify its earlier findings, observing that: 
the Sunset Policy Bulletin further instructs that Commerce will normally 
find [continued] likelihood [of dumping] where, inter alia, dumping was 
eliminated after the issuance of the order and import volumes for the 
subject merchandise decline significantly.67  
It found that: 
… pursuant to the Panel’s instructions, we have considered additional 
information with respect to the “other factors” alleged by NHCI. In doing 
so, we continue to conclude upon remand that the rate calculated during 
                                               
62 This is provided by Art. 11.3 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade 1994 (also known as the WTO Antidumping Agreement). 
63 Pure Magnesium from Canada (Final Results of the Sunset Review of Antidumping Order on Pure Magnesium from 
Canada), 65 Fed. Reg. 41436 (July 5, 2000). 
64 Pure Magnesium from Canada, USA-CDA-00-1904-06 (March 27, 2002). 
65 Ibid., p. 28. 
66 Ibid., Conclusion. 
67 Pure Magnesium from Canada (Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Panel Remand), USA-CDA-00-1904-06, p. 7 
(Jan. 28, 2003). 
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the investigation is the only calculated rate that reflects the behaviour of 
NHCI absent an order … Commerce is not convinced that NHCI is no 
longer interested in the pure magnesium market. Moreover, NHCI has not 
been able to sell in the U.S. market in commercial quantities since the 
imposition of the antidumping duty order. We have relied on our previous 
findings of non-commercial quantities in the administrative reviews of this 
order to reinforce our conclusion that NHCI’s shipments to the United 
States declined significantly since the imposition of the original order. … 
We have analyzed the facts in this sunset review again upon remand and 
conclude that the margins from the original investigation are probative of 
the behaviour of Canadian producers and exporters of pure magnesium if 
the order were to be revoked.68 
 This last passage provides something sense of the attitude that the panel later had 
so much trouble with. On return to the binational panel a second time, the principal issue 
appeared to be the contra preferentum way in which the Department had dealt with the 
issues on a successive occasions, effectively reversing the onus.69 Taken to the extreme 
advocated by the Department, the position would require that once a dumping order had 
been put in place it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for any order to be revoked. 
 The panel later remanded Commerce’s first re-determination in the sunset review 
for a second time, “for further consideration of the record concerning the “other factors” 
which are required to be taken into account in Sections 2 and 3 of the Panel’s opinion;  
(ii) for consideration of whether this is an appropriate case in which to supplement the 
record after obtaining the views of the parties; and (iii) to reconsider whether the normal 
preference for the investigation rate should not be followed here.” This direction is 
almost the same as the first direction on two of the three major points. In its second re-
determination – the third time it was dealing with the matter - the Department came to 
exactly the same result as it had in the past. It concluded: 
                                               
68 Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
69 For example, “There is no evidence on the record of the sunset review indicating that any long-term contracts NHCI has 
with its alloy magnesium customers prevent NHCI from increasing it[s] production of pure magnesium in the future.” 
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[W]e are convinced that NHCI’s long-term contract commitments would 
not change the outcome of this sunset review. There is significant 
additional information on the record from Commerce’s previous 
administrative reviews and this sunset review that leads us to conclude 
that absent the antidumping order on Pure Magnesium from Canada, 
dumping is likely to continue or recur. … Thus, as we determined in our 
first remand, we find it reasonable to conclude that prior to the order, 
Canadian producers were only able to maintain their share of import levels 
by dumping. … We continue to conclude upon remand that the rate 
calculated during the investigation is the only calculated rate that reflects 
the behaviour of NHCI absent an order.70 
Evidently aggravating the situation was the fact that the Department also refused to 
consider new information submitted by NHCI on the issue of pricing. Given that the 
Department’s own practice on this point has been inconsistent and that it was by then 
aware of the panel’s stridency in this case, the refusal appeared to be further evidence of 
the Department’s determination to insist upon its position. 
 The agency’s failure to adequately address the points raised by the binational 
panel in the second remand prompted a third complaint by the GOQ to the panel, which 
on this occasion expressed its concern with the agency’s failure to thoroughly address the 
evidence before it. In July 2003 it therefore remanded the Department’s decision “with 
instructions to revoke the anti-dumping order on pure magnesium from Canada.”71 The 
direct language obviously rankled the Department, which issued the following tartly-
worded rebuttal a few days later: 
Publication of this notice fulfils the obligation imposed upon the 
Department by the decision in Timken. In addition, this notice will serve to 
continue the suspension of liquidation. If an Extraordinary Challenge 
Committee panel request is not filed, or if an ECC panel request is filed, 
and the NAFTA panel’s decision is upheld, the Department will publish 
amended final sunset review results revoking the anti-dumping order on 
                                               
70 Pure Magnesium from Canada (Final Results of the Sunset Review of Antidumping Order on Pure Magnesium from 
Canada), USA-CAN-00-1904-06, pp. 12, 15 (Jan. 28, 2003). 
71 Pure Magnesium from Canada (Final Results of the Sunset Review of Antidumping Order on Pure Magnesium from 
Canada), USA-CAN-00-1904-06, p. 23 (April 28, 2003). 
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pure magnesium from Canada.72 
As if to further underscore its displeasure with the result, the U.S. indicated in early 
October 2003 that it was taking the highly unusual step of proceeding with an 
Extraordinary Challenge under NAFTA Art. 1904(13) in Pure Magnesium on the 
grounds that the panel had “manifestly exceeded its powers, authority and jurisdiction” 
and its actions had “materially affected the panel’s decision and threaten[ed] the integrity 
of the binational panel review process … .”73 This was only the second time that an 
Extraordinary Challenge had been launched under NAFTA, and only the second time 
under either NAFTA or the FTA that an Extraordinary Challenge did not involve an 
allegation of misconduct by an individual panellist.74 
 Agency resistance has been even more apparent in High Fructose Corn Syrup75, a 
case involving access to the Mexican market for U.S.-produced high fructose corn syrup 
whose primary use is as an industrial sweetener. In the 1990s growing imports of corn 
syrup put pressure on the Mexican sugar industry. The dispute began in January 1998 
when the Mexican Secretary of the Economy (or “IA” for “Investigating Authority”) 
published a final antidumping determination that dumped imports of corn syrup from the 
U.S. threatened material injury. A month later U.S.-based producers initiated a complaint 
under NAFTA Ch. 19 alleging that the investigation had been conducted in a highly 
irregular fashion, including allegations of numerous procedural errors and the possibility 
                                               
72 68 Fed. Reg. 42004-01 (July 16, 2003). 
73 U.S. Proceeds to Extraordinary Challenge in NAFTA Magnesium Case, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Oct. 17, 2003). 
74 An Extraordinary Challenge may be launched where a panel member is guilty of misconduct, a panel seriously departs 
from a fundamental rule of procedure or a panel manifestly exceeds its powers and where any of these actions has 
materially affected the panel decision and threatens the integrity of the binational panel review process. There were three 
Extraordinary Challenges under the FTA, all of them launched by the U.S. and all of them unsuccessful. In October 2003 
an Extraordinary Challenge Committee dismissed allegations in Gray Portland Cement and Clinker from Mexico (5th 
Administrative Review), ECC-2000-1904-01USA (Oct. 30, 2003) that the binational panel acted in a manner that 
“threaten[ed] the integrity of the Binational Panel Review process”. A decision in the Pure Magnesium ECC is due 
sometime in 2004.  
75 Review of the Final Determination of the Antidumping Investigation on Imports of High Fructose Corn Syrup, Originating 
from the United States of America, MEX-USA-98-1904-01 (Aug. 3, 2001). 
 33 
that Mexican officials involved in the antidumping investigation had colluded with 
Mexican sugar interests.76 A series of delays in the appointment of panel members 
resulted in the case not being heard until August 2000. Many further challenges followed. 
Nevertheless the binational panel rendered its first decision in August 2001.77 
 Although it is easy to be awed by the more melodramatic aspects of the 
proceedings, the real issue in High Fructose revolved around whether there was sufficient 
evidence for SECOFI to identify a threat of material injury. In this respect it should be 
recalled that the international law on which NAFTA antidumping claims are ultimately 
based requires that “a threat of material injury shall be based on facts and not merely on 
allegations, conjecture or remote possibility.”78 This standard is specified in order to 
forestall indiscriminate use of antidumping action as a non-tariff barrier. In its first 
determination, however, the panel found there to be clear evidence that conditions in the 
Mexican sugar industry were actually improving. It contrasted this with SECOFI’s 
conclusion: 
that the IA’s determination rests on the projection of a sudden and massive 
import of fructose in 1997. This Panel has found that the record does not 
support such a determination. This projection is not based on fact, but on 
allegation, conjecture and remote possibility … The [investigating 
authority’s] analysis falls short of providing a meaningful or defensible 
explanation as to why HFCS imports would injure or threaten to cause 
injury when they presently show an improving domestic industry.79 
The panel therefore concluded that: 
                                               
76 The complaint triggering the antidumping investigation was made by the Mexican National Chamber of Sugar and 
Alcohol Industries. On binational review the panel heard claims relating to the Sugar Chamber’s ability to initiate a 
complaint and its standing in the proceedings, the commencement of proceedings without certain necessary information, 
and SECOFI’s determination of corn syrup as a “like” product to sugar, The panel also heard arguments that SECOFI did 
not give the full opportunity for a defence and other procedural protections to U.S. corn syrup producers.   
77 See supra, note 25. 
78 This wording appear sin Art. 3.7 of the WTO Antidumping Agreement, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994). Article 3.7 further specifies 
that “The change in circumstances which would create a situation in which the dumping would cause injury must be 
clearly foreseen and imminent.” 
79 Review of the Final Determination of the Antidumping Investigation on Imports of High Fructose Corn Syrup, Originating 
from the United States of America, MEX-USA-98-1904-01, paras. 827-828 (Aug. 3, 2001). 
 34 
the IA has only two causes of action that are consistent with this 
determination of the panel. The Panel therefore orders the following: 
1. that because the IA has failed to prove threat of injury, the IA promptly 
terminate the anti-dumping duties imposed to the HFCS imports 
originating in the United States of America and refund the duties collected 
since the imposition of those duties; or 
2. should the IA wish to re-evaluate what basis and justification – if any – 
there is for its finding of threat of injury, consistent with the findings of 
this Panel, and in light of the multiple proceedings already completed, it 
proceed accordingly.80 
The extreme specificity of the remedy in this case (“the IA has only two causes of 
action”) may be welcome evidence of a desire for precision, but it is also undoubtedly 
attributable to the protracted nature of the proceedings and the fact of very public 
disagreement over the result.81 
 A complicating factor was concurrent litigation before the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). Due to frustration with the slow pace in the case under NAFTA the 
U.S. government had begun parallel proceedings before the WTO in May 1998. A WTO 
panel rendered its decision in High Fructose in January 2000. In that decision the WTO 
found that Mexico had failed to identify evidence that would establish the threat of injury 
sufficient to justify the duties imposed.82 However, WTO panels are much more 
constrained in their remedial jurisdiction than their NAFTA Ch. 19 counterparts, being 
limited to the directive that: 
Where a panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measure is 
inconsistent with a covered agreement, it shall recommend that the 
Member concerned bring the measure into conformity with that 
                                               
80 See text of Order, MEX-USA-98-1904-01 (Aug. 3, 2001). 
81 One of the panelists, Saul L. Sherman, declined to sign the report. 




Practice under the WTO Agreement appears to confirm the tendency of panels to follow 
this direction literally with very little elaboration.84 
 SECOFI’s action to comply to the WTO panel’s remedy in High Fructose was to 
redo its original investigation with minimal elaboration. For the binational panel this 
immediately raised the question of what to do with the WTO’s decision and Mexico’s 
attempt to comply. Although there are some indications that in the event of conflict 
NAFTA should prevail, the binational panel accepted the WTO’s outcome as dispositive 
on points where it had already made a determination and considered its own jurisdiction 
to be “limited, in what it considers legally justified, to the points not considered by the 
[WTO panel] in applying the principle of comity.”85 For this reason too, the binational 
panel ruled that it had jurisdiction over SECOFI’s original determination and the revised 
determination arising from SECOFI’s attempt to comply with the WTO Agreement. 
 As seen, the panel specified on remand that Mexico had two options: re-
determination or revocation and repayment. However, activity by Mexican officials over 
the next eight months was insufficient for either of these purposes.86 In April 2002 a 
reconvened binational panel issued its second decision in High Fructose in even sharper 
terms than before, as follows: 
Whereas: 
                                               
83 See WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, Art. 19.1, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994). 
84 A WTO panel has, for instance, refused to make an order for the repayment of antidumping duties part of its 
recommendation, or to require the repeal of WTO-inconsistent antidumping legislation. 
85 Review of the Final Determination of the Antidumping Investigation on Imports of High Fructose Corn Syrup, Originating 
from the United States of America, MEX-USA-98-1904-01, para. 188 (Aug. 3, 2001). 
86 Most obviously of concern was the behaviour of the Secretary of the Economy which refused to appear or cooperate 
with the panel at this stage of the proceedings. The panel was then left in the position of having to review the revised 
determination and the adjusted report as the sole source of the Secretary’s decision. For this reason the panel observed 
that it “had no opportunity to clarify the many obscure and ambiguous aspects of the [investigating authority’s] discussion 
of threat of injury.” 
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1. The IA has had multiple opportunities to both review the material in the 
administrative record and to expand upon it as a result of the first review 
by the WTO-DSB; and 
2. The IA has twice failed to demonstrate to this Panel that the 
administrative record supports its conclusion that imports of HFCS from 
the United States pose a threat of injury to the Mexican sugar market; and 
3. Under the terms of NAFTA Chapter 19, panel review of these 
determinations is to be based exclusively on the administrative record. 
4. That there exists no support in the combined record resulting form the 
original investigation and from the investigation carried out by the IA 
regarding its Original Decision, for the conclusion of the IA that imports 
of HFCS from the United States pose a threat of injury to the Mexican 
sugar industry, rendering the three determinations adopted by the IA 
inconsistent to international provisions and applicable laws. 
5. As a result of this determination, this Panel also finds that the 
imposition and collection of the antidumping duties posed to HFCS 
imports coming from the United States of America had been and continue 
being inconsistent to international provisions and applicable laws, 
inasmuch as they were the result of the unlawful conclusion of the IA 
regarding threat of injury also inconsistent to international provisions and 
applicable laws. 
Now, therefore, it orders the following: 
This Panel remands this matter to the IA to take action consistent with the 
Panel's Decision that the duties have been imposed and collected contrary 
to law, no later than 30 days following the entry of this decision. 
 While the procedural to-ing and fro-ing in both Pure Magnesium and High 
Fructose is impressive, it should not obscure the fact that the central explanation for the 
failure to comply in this instance was the inability of panels and national agencies to 
reach an understanding of what needed to be done. In other words, there was no 
underlying agreement as to the elements requiring change. Each adjudicator persisted in 
their own appreciation of the law and facts, a situation that ultimately led to dissonant 
results. 
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 Both Pure Magnesium and High Fructose also demonstrate how panels have a 
limited power to get at and assess the evidence and how this disability effectively 
handicaps their remedial jurisdiction. They rely on agencies to make the initial 
assessment, effectively assuming a default role after the agency has made a 
determination. When the agency refuses to act or to do anything new however, the 
binational panel is compelled to dictate the specific result it seeks. This is an extreme 
outcome and something that leaves the binational panel open to the charge that it 
exceeded its jurisdiction, as the Department’s phrasing of its final rebuttal in High 
Fructose implies.   
 It is also noteworthy that in both cases – despite entirely different benches and 
obviously different facts – binational panels felt authorized to issue specific orders where 
two reviews had passed. Ostensibly there is no magic in the number two. Other cases 
under NAFTA Ch. 19 have involved two reviews and less spectacular results. However, 
what two provides for corresponds with the stages of legal appreciation in most 
developed systems of domestic law: a stage of initial fact-finding and an appeal. In the 
case of Ch. 19 review the national agency is authorized and justified to make an initial 
determination, which the panel will review in the normal exercise of its jurisdiction. If a 
re-determination is required, then the panel will remand, leaving itself the option of 
further review. At this point the issues are reasonably clear. Indeed, in both Pure 
Magnesium and High Fructose they hardly changed at all. The agency is subsequently 
left to make a determination which must be confirmed by the panel, meaning that the 
panel has the ultimate right of approval. If it effectively does nothing, then the panel in 
the exercise of its reserve power is motivated to act to preserve the effectiveness and 
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integrity of the system. An informal dictum of “two strikes and you’re out” appears to be 
emerging.     
6. Conclusion 
 If this article began with the observation that anniversaries are good opportunities 
to take stock, then it is appropriate to end on that note as well. The question of remedial 
limits posed at the outset of this article has an answer: panels in all three NAFTA 
jurisdictions have ventured beyond the confines of the treaty wording and have yielded 
generally acceptable - and occasionally even forceful - results. Given the panels’ review 
function these results are often negative in nature, but they have substantial positive 
elements, requiring national agencies to do certain things before final confirmation from 
a panel is received. 
 Decisions such as Live Swine and Machine Tufted Carpets represent perhaps the 
high-water mark in binational panel activism. In those instances panel conclusions caused 
outcomes to change markedly. In many other cases, a close reading is required to 
determine what the actual outcome of remand is and the result has been far less dramatic. 
But there is also no doubt that, as seen in High Fructose, Pure Magnesium and the 
Carbon Steel cases, national agencies continue to “bridle at the bit”. There is resistance to 
binational panel decision-making, and it is difficult to tell how persistent such behaviour 
will continue to be. 
 Much of this reaction can be understood by analyzing the form and function of 
binational panels. A framework for such analysis was presented by Anne-Marie Slaughter 
in her 1992 article A Typology of Transjudicial Communication87. There she observed 
that “[c]ourts are talking to one another all over the world” and posited that there are two 
                                               
87 See supra, note 7. 
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forms of transjudicial communication, horizontal and vertical. Horizontal communication 
takes place between courts of the same status; vertical communication between national 
and supranational courts. It is into the second of Slaughter’s categories that the process of 
NAFTA Ch. 19 can be placed: binational panels act as supranational tribunals reviewing 
the work of national agencies. At the same time, Slaughter also suggested that 
transjudicial communication should be distinguished by the degree of “reciprocal 
engagement” that arises. In NAFTA this could be characterized as a process of “direct 
dialogue”, or what Slaughter describes as “communication between two courts that is 
effectively initiated by one and responded to by other.” The difficulty with applying 
Slaughter’s typology to the case of NAFTA Ch. 19 is that she describes direct dialogue’s 
“distinguishing feature” as being “the awareness on the part of both participants of whom 
they are talking to and a willingness to take account of the response.”88 Such willingness 
cannot yet be taken for granted of national agencies in their response to binational panel 
reports. As seen, it is the inability of national agencies to arrive at any underlying 
agreement with binational panels over what needs to be changed that is the greatest flaw 
in the process to date. 
 The reason for these differences is best identified by means of a comparison with 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Commentators today tend to gloss over the early 
difficulties of the ECJ in establishing a “habit of deference” to its decisions among 
European national courts without always appreciating the incrementalism involved.89 In 
                                               
88 Ibid., p. 113. 
89 Two landmark cases in establishing the Court’s importance were Van Gend en Loos and Simmenthal. In Van Gend en 
Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen,  [1963] E.C.R. 1 the European Court made its now famous 
observation that “[t]he objective of the EEC Treaty, which is to establish a common market, the functioning of which is of 
direct concern to interested parties in the Community, implies that this Treaty is more than an agreement which merely 
creates mutual obligations between the contracting States. This view is confirmed by the preamble to the Treaty, which 
refers not only to governments but to peoples. It is also confirmed more specifically by the establishment of institutions 
endowed with sovereign rights, the exercise of which affects Member States and also their citizens. The conclusion to be 
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fact, the European Court had to develop a role for itself over several decades. This effort 
was aided immeasurably by the existence of a separate body of law that the ECJ could 
claim to be the ultimate interpreter of and by its express purpose to protect the role of 
individuals – a role that national courts could be readily enlisted in. 
 In the case of binational panels under Ch. 19, a number of factors suggest that 
such incrementalism may be much more gradual. Both elements commonly identified as 
critical to the European Court’s hard-earned success – a distinct body of law and a 
mission to protect individual rights – are missing from Ch. 19. Binational panels do not 
have a separate body of law that they are the acknowledged guardian of. If anything, they 
compete with national agencies in the interpretation of domestic law. In some sense they 
are trying to move into territory that is already occupied and as seen in the Carbon Steel 
case, this is hard to do. Binational panels also do not share the same role as national 
agencies and therefore cannot appeal to them for assistance in fulfilling a common 
purpose. The role of binational panels may be to reinforce the interpretation of AD/CVD 
laws with an eye to protecting individual rights, but the role of national agencies is more 
evidently to ensure the law’s proper application in order to counter dumping or 
subsidization that causes material injury. These purposes are distinct and the differences 
suggest that panels must be constantly vigilant if they are to fulfil their function fully 
under NAFTA. 
                                                                                                                                            
draw from this is that the Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the States 
have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States 
but also their nationals.” Van Gend en Loos gave expression to the idea that Community law constituted a separate legal 
order which the ECJ was first and foremost entrusted with interpreting. Later, in Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato 
v. Simmenthal SpA, [1978] E.C.R. 629 the European Court held that “the relationship between provisions of the 
[European] Treaty and directly applicable measures of the institutions on one hand and the national law of the Member 
States on the other is such that those provisions and measures not only by their entry into force render automatically 
inapplicable and conflicting provision of national law but … also preclude the valid adoption of new national legislative 
measures to the extent which they would be incompatible with Community provisions.” This expression by the Court is 
commonly taken to recognize the supremacy of EC over conflicting domestic law. 
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 There are, in addition, other factors which indicate that the process of more 
automatic acceptance of panel decisions will be a long time in coming. Binational panels 
are ad hoc institutions. Their short-lived nature constantly works against any emerging 
sense of continuity and institutional identity. They also have fewer opportunities to 
develop the elements of judicial autonomy, persuasive authority, and common judicial 
enterprise that Slaughter identifies as preconditions for successful transjudicial 
communication.90 National agencies know this. As seen in this article, a form of dialogue 
does already exist between institutions, but without authoritative or precedential effect 
there is always the temptation to revert to old ways.  
 Of course a legal critic might always hope for conflict between panels and 
agencies that is even more graphic than that detailed here in order to illustrate the 
problems discussed, but we have to remember the wider context. It is a context of three 
relatively mature democracies that have collectively agreed to surrender some 
sovereignty in exchange for bilateral review of certain administrative decisions and for 
the enhanced legitimacy this entails. In 1994 they were not willing to go much further 
and it is unlikely that they would go still further today. A cynic might be tempted to 
dismiss Ch. 19 as window-dressing, essentially a cover by which retired judges and other 
worthies are used to rubber-stamp agency decisions. Yet as seen, there have been some 
changes, and arguably, any improvement to official decision-making is of some value. 
Corrections have been made, even if they sometimes appear small and are hard to 
appreciate cumulatively. This is particularly important in an era when business is 
conducted on razor-thin margins. 
 There have also been developments as a result of Ch. 19 that transcend pure 
                                               
90 Slaughter, supra, note 7, p. 122. 
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economics and the bottom line. A procedure for review now exists. A body of law has 
been created. Transparency has been promoted. One has the sense in reading decisions 
that national agencies are more careful, even if, perhaps, they are also more careful at 
immunizing themselves from effective review and at covering their tracks.91 Hence, 
while Ch. 19 might be considered a technicality by laypersons, it still represents 
something, something that we - as North Americans - have done in a decade together. 
 
                                               
91 In this regard the Commerce Department observed in Gray Portland Cement and Clinker from Mexico, USA-MEX-1997-
1904-03, p. 13, that “If we were not to correct this error now, we would necessarily have to request another remand so 
that we could correct this error. Therefore, in order to forestall another remand on this case over the matter of a clear 
clerical error and to thereby conserve scarce administrative resources, we have decided in this instance to accept STCC’s 
submission as well as respondent’s rebuttal comments, and correct this clerical error in the context of this remand.” 
